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The paper investigates how the global financial and the ensuing European 
sovereign crisis affected the public debt dynamics of the EU member 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which countries are generally 
facing difficulties in keeping fiscal discipline as a negative consequence of 
global and regional financial turbulences. It reveals how economic 
factors (real GDP growth, interest rates, primary deficit) affected the 
trend of public debt in the period after 2008 among new EU members on 
the basis of Eurostat and European Economy statistics. After the briefing 
of some relevant government debt theories (among others Marcet and 
Scott, 2003, Díaz-Giménez and Giovanetti, 2007, Garcia et al., 2011, 
Broner et al., 2014), the paper provides a descriptive analysis of the debt 
structure of eight Central and Eastern European countries in recent 
years. It compares the currency composition of the governments’ 
liabilities, discusses the role the domestic public sector plays in financing 
public debt, and whether there is evidence of domestic financing crowding 
out private investment in these countries. In the light of CDS premia and 
reference yields financing costs are contrasted and the way debt 
management strategies are formulated and government debt instruments 
are chosen in order to mitigate the financial burden caused by 
government indebtedness are compared. Finally, the paper summarises 
the lessons of the Hungarian self-financing programme launched in April 
2014 by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary).  
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2008 global financial crisis shaked all countries of Europe 
independent of geographical situation or economic development and transformed 
to the crisis of sovereigns. The sovereign debt problem of Europe became more 
pronounced with the announcement of the true level of budgetary deficit in 
Greece in November 2009. A series of negotiations started how to protect Greece 
from default on debt, how European institutions can take part in the financing of 
public debt in the PIIGS and what measures should be taken to prevent financial 
innstability caused by budgetary imbalances of member states in the future. The 
sovereign debt crisis of Europe spread over to the Eastern periphery: at the end of 
2011 Hungary was downgraded again then followed Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia 
and Slovakia1. The process seems not to be over as Greece is still fighting with 
everyday payment problems arising from debt, Slovenia launched new bailout 
package for banks and Hungary uses a series of unconventional economic policy 
measures to tackle the debt problem. The paper investigates the dynamics of 
public debt in the CEECs after 2007, the structure of debt and addresses some 
policy implications.  
 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC DEBT 
A simple macroeconomic framework cited by among other Oblath-
Valentinyi (1983) describes the dynamics of public debt accumulation by 
deriving the equation below: 
=                                                                (1) 
This equation illustrates the real economic factors which affect the 
dynamics of public debt in time: the primary balance as a percentage of GDP (d), 
the real increase of the quantity of money in the given period (µm), and the initial 
level of the debt-to-GDP ratio (b), where the latter contributes to the increase in 
the stock of liability to the extent at which the real interest rate (r) (plus real 
depreciation in the case of foreign currency denominated liabilities: ) exceeds 
the real growth of GDP ( y). The causes of the accumulation of public debt are 
well summed up in the above equation: apart from government overspending, 
whose effect is obviously debt generating, the slowing down of the economic 
performance of the economy and the interest expectations, as well as currency 
depreciation are important determinants as well.  
Especially since the onset of the global financial crisis the scope of 
public debt theory has oriented to explain the consequences of government 
indebtedness. The seminal study of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) confirmed that a 
debt-to-GDP level exceeding 90% can be a strong impediment to growth whereas 
                                                 
1 Croatia’s and Hungary’s credit rating is still below the investment grade. 
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it is difficult to detect any reliable relation between growth and public debt below 
this level. A lot of criticism was raised against this finding, Herndon-Ash-Pollin 
(2013) attacked the methods and called the attention of the importance of the time 
period and country, Égert (2013) also emphasised that the impact of public debt 
on real GDP growth is rather dependent on the data series and modelling choices.  
In any case governments in the EU countries have to face a serious 
constraint to stimulating the economy and at the same time intending to comply 
with the Maastricht fiscal policy rule if interest rates are high and interest 
expenditures leave no room for manoeuvre for fiscal policy. Garcia et al. (2011) 
call the attention to the problem of procyclical fiscal policy and ensuing 
macroeconomic volatility as a possible consequence of applying fiscal rules 
especially in emerging economies. Marcet and Scott (2003) compare complete 
and incomplete bond markets for investigating the impact of macroeconomic 
shocks on public debt. They are dubious about the application of fiscal rules as 
these rules do not differentiate between those governments which have to suffer 
great fluctuations in the debt-to-GDP ratio because of their incomplete security 
markets and those which simply conduct an insolvent economic policy. The 
formation of a complete market is therefore more advantageous as the volatility 
of taxes can be directly mitigated and the sustainability of debt better tested. In 
the opposite case higher interest rates today mean higher taxes in the future.  
Many studies address the question of inflating public debt (Díaz-
Giménez and Giovanetti, 2007, Martin, 2009). It is again not a real alternative for 
EU member countries but some authors suggest that in certain economic 
circumstances active and discretionary monetary policy can be a remedy for the 
problem of indebtedness instead of strict rules (for instance Araujo and Leon, 
2004 on public debt in a currency union). 
Finally, Miller and Foster (2012) call our attention to the relationship 
between public debt and economic freedom2 by stating the governments 
favouring economic freedom are likely to strengthen a country’s growth potential 
and “create an environment that reduces the risk of debt”. Notwithstanding, 
Miller and Kim (2012) acknowledge that debt can contribute to increased 
productivity if it is used to reduce the tax burden and finance productive 
investment. If the increase in public debt is a permanent phenomenon it might 
reflect poor policy choices and the lack of economic freedom as well. 
 
PUBLIC DEBT IN THE CEECS BEFORE THE CRISIS 
It is interesting to see on what economic path Central and Eastern 
European countries were progressing in terms of public finances before the 
                                                 
2 According to Miller and Kim (2012, p. 14): „three fundamental principles of economic freedom – 
empowerment of the individual, non-discrimination, and open competition – underpin every 
measurement and policy idea” related to the term. 
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financial crisis. Among the many explanations of debt accumulation as regards 
economic freedom Treidler (2015) pointed out that the Czech Republic has an 
outstanding score in economic freedom (covering freedom of fiscal policy 
decisions as well), whereas Slovenia is appraised to be below the regional 
average. At the same time Németh (2015) examined whether election budgeting 
was present in the region and came to the conclusion that increased government 
spending can be detected in the Visegrad countries (including the Czech 
Republic, Hungary Poland and Slovakia): in election years governments tended to 
spend more in order to obtain voter’s trust and the consequence was a deficit path 
following political cycles. In the case of Hungary this cyclicality of the budget 
meant an unequivocal contribution to today’s above average debt level, mostly in 
the years of 2002 and 2006. Another explanation why fiscal policy decision-
makers were interested in raising debt-to-GDP levels is offered by the public debt 
as strategic variable approach (Alesina-Tabellini, 1990). According to this 
interpretation current policy-makers pile up massive government liabilities to 
make it difficult for new incoming parties. In the years preceding the crisis again 
the Visegrad countries can be suspected of this political gimmick whereas 
Slovenia and Bulgaria did not use debt as strategic variable. EU accession could 
be also used strategically to create confidence in the economy and make austerity 
measures more acceptable, as was observable in the case of the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Romania, this in contrast contributed to the stabilisation of the 
budget (Takács-Benczes, 2015). Hungary, on the contrary, had to apply 
procyclical fiscal policy by breaching the Maastricht deficit rule between 2002 
and 2008 and had to undergo the excessive deficit procedure due to a distorted 
structure (the still dominant social transfer payments like during socialist times) 
of the general government, budgetary overspending and stop-and-go economic 
policy (Constantinovits, 2014, Benczes, 2015). Slovakia did not need to build 
trust by increasing social payments, it instead reformed the budget as early as in 
1997 and then could maintain the results of this reform (Győrffy, 2015). Poland 
has also been strongly committed to the 60% debt-to-GDP rule which is even 
stipulated in the Polish constitution. (Kozenkow, 2015) Finally, Croatia followed 
an atypical model of economic policy (Sieger, 2015). Facing the double challenge 
of an armed conflict and transformation at a time, the debt ratio could only be 
kept moderate until privatisation revenues could counterbalance budgetary 
overspending. Between 2002 and 2008 Croatia could then achieve a declining 
public debt ratio but due to the growing economy and not major fiscal policy 
reforms (Sieger, 2015). It did not really take advantage of EU accession as 
strategic tool as there was a lot of scepticism around this policy step. 
In the course of the financial crisis mostly external factors dominated the 
forming of government debt and most governments simply reacted by budgetary 
loosening (except Hungary). The picture since then concerning figures is 
probably more diverse then the strategies leading to the current post-crisis 
situation. 
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THE DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC DEBT AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 
In the course of the European sovereign crisis it became a striking 
question whether the excessive indebtedness prevailing in Western European 
countries would also reach the block of new member states. As regards Hungary, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio was not much lagging behind the eurozone average already 
in 2007 before the global financial crisis also hit Europe. 
The severity of the debt problem by now is manifested by the data of last 
year when three countries of the Central European region recorded over 60% 
public debt, the threshold defined by the Maastricht Treaty, according to the new 
statistical methodology ESA 2010. In the V4 countries (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) the upward tendency seems to have come to a 
hault but Slovenia and Croatia are facing a menacing debt accumulation process 
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Figure 1: Debt-to-GDP in the CEECs and the eurozone between 2007-2014, 
Source: Eurostat, 2015 
Among the factors driving public debt levels high (see Appendix 1) it is 
apparent that primary deficit was much responsible to the accumulation of public 
liabilites. As most EU countries used Keynesian fiscal stimulus to spark 
economic growth, primary deficit was above 2% on average in the majority of the 
countries under examination after 2008. Hungary is a striking exception as due to 
its highest debt-to-GDP in the region reaching 80% in 2009 it had to maintain 
budgetary discipline through procyclical fiscal policy to exit the excessive deficit 
procedure. The interest expenditure of the government itself accounts for more 
than 3% of GDP every year, therefore the compliance with the deficit criterion 
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requires the positive balance of the primary budget. The other reason why it had 
to hold the budget tight was that the interest-growth differential was evolving in 
an unfavourable way, a tendency of growing out of debt only commenced in 
2014. This resulted in a policy targeting primary surpluses between 2008 and 
2014 in order to offset debt increasing real economic factors (real interest 
spending minus real GDP growth, see formula 1). The interest burden is the 
highest here, not only due to higher GDP proportional levels in the period 
average but also due to the highest risk premium in the region until 2014. Having 
a paralysed budget, the Central Bank of Hungary (MNB) had to introduce a credit 
easing programme in order to facilitate the recovery from recession. The Czech 
Republic was the other country characterised by moderate budgetary spending 
due to its mostly negative real GDP growth in the last couple of years. Poland 
was investing much in the economy and could maintain a growing GDP 
throughout the period. With the help of these three different strategies the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Hungary could almost return to the pre-crisis ratio of public 
debt by the end of 2014. The fourth Visegrad country, Slovakia, was performing 
somewhat less successfully due to the large economic stimulus packages but its 
continuously positive real economic growth prevented it from surpassing the 60% 
threshold.  
Bulgaria and Romania had to cope with a sharp increase in debt as a 
consequence of high CDS premia together with a moderate growth. Romania 
could start cutting back spending before reaching any threatening level of and 
Bulgaria could totally avoid a significant increase in the debt-to-GDP ration due 
to their low initial levels. The evident losers of the crisis are Croatia and Slovenia. 
In the lack of reliable data it is difficult to gauge the role of the government in the 
sharp increase in debt in Croatia, but the real economic factors (interest and GDP 
growth) meant a strong contribution. Between 2012 and 2013 there must have 
been a strong stock-flow adjustment due to change in methodology that triggered 
government debt as there is no explanation for the extreme growth in the 
underlying data. The situation in Slovenia has become similarly severe in 
Slovenia, beside the fairly negative real economic conditions the government 
spent more than 10% of GDP in 2012 than its revenues mainly as a consequence 
of the bank bailout programme.  
Despite the growing debt in the region between 2008 and 2014, it is 
difficult to find any relation between the public debt level of a country and GDP 
growth. Comparing the average of the eight years preceding the crisis with that of 
the crisis and post-crisis period we can ascertain that the economic performance 
of Central and Eastern European countries has become extremely diverse. Among 
the best performing are those having a debt-to-GDP ratio around 40-60% on 
average but there are outliers both in the low, middle and high debt ratio countries 
as well. As concerns the real GDP growth data in recent years the crisis does not 
seem to be over and there are signs of the threat of a renewed South Central 
European sovereign debt crisis (encompassing Serbia and Slovenia and other post 
Yugoslavian countries). 




THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC DEBT 
On the basis of 2012 and 2013 data, reliance on foreign savings is most 
characteristic of the Hungarian public debt in the group of the Central European 
new members of the EU (Figure 4). The unfavourable structure is not simply a 
consequence of domestic investors’ investment preferences but it is also a result 
of the above regional average of Hungarian public debt which might not be 
possible to cover from domestic savings. (In 2012 and 2013 the gross nominal 
public debt amounted to more than a quarter of the gross /non-consolidated/ stock 
of financial assets of the domestic financial corporations and households and 
some 70% of the financial assets of credit institutions therein.) It is a promising 
phenomenon, however, that households play a greater role as investors in the 
government securities market in Hungary than in the neighbouring countries. 
Among the countries under examination the financial sector of Croatia3 a country 
also having more than 60% debt-to-GDP enjoys more dominance in public debt 
financing (its share exceeds 60%) than in Hungary where this value is the lowest 
(hardly more than 30%). We can conclude that domestic financing has to have 
room for manoeuvre in Hungary and above all the participation of the financial 
sector can be extended. 
 
                                                 
3 There are no sectoral data available for Slovenia in Eurostat and on the website of the Slovenian 
Ministry of Finance 
PUBLIC FINANCE 829 
 
Examining the currency denomination of public debt (Figure 5) it can be 
established that the share of domestic currency in total public debt is the greatest 
in Slovakia and Slovenia (above 90%) which is not surprising as the two 
countries have already joined the eurozone (Slovenia in 2007 and Slovakia in 
2009.) The Slovenian Ministry of Finance does not use any benchmark in its 
yearly financing programme of the central government, it describes the set of 
securities used for financing and defines the debt management guidelines 
respecting the Public Finance Act (PFA). However, it also uses swap transactions 
in USD denominated bonds and this way contributes to the almost 100% euro 
dominated financing structure. Slovakia does not use any declared portfolio 
benchmarks. The two countries are very active in the international sovereign bond 
markets with the issuance of government securities (eurobond issues are 
dominant). 
Among the countries outside the eurozone Croatia, Bulgaria and 
Romania have a significant part of their debt in foreign denominations (close to 
60-80%). The economy can be characterised by strong dollarisation and 
euroisation in Southern Slavic countries and Bulgaria which can be well traced in 
the liabilities structure of banks (in 2012 the stock of foreign currency 
denominated deposits in total liabilities accounted for more than 40% of all 
liabilities and 70% of the total deposit stock in Croatia /Živko-Kandžija, 2013/). 
Whereas Croatia earlier aimed at reducing the share of foreign denominated 
public debt to around 40%, in 2011-2013 the financing plan does not include any 
benchmark for currency structure. (Bajo-Primorac, 2011). In its two-year 
government debt management strategy the Bulgarian Ministry of Finance puts 
emphasis on the importance of a diversified debt portfolio but does not use 
numeric policy targets. Romania sets target intervals for currency denomination, 
maturity and interest composition of public debt in its two-year debt management 
strategy. 
Among the Visegrad four Hungary evidently occupies the last place as 
concerns financing public debt from domestic currency in 2012 and 2013 (with an 
approximately 55 per cent rate). According to the strategic benchmarks of the 
State Debt Management Agency a maximum of 45% in 2014 and 40% in 2015 
can be the share of foreign currency denominated assets in total debt and the 
purpose is to graudally reduce this share further (ÁKK, 2014). The issuance of a 
growing share of domestic household securities is also an important feature of the 
debt financing strategy together with maturity and interest rate targets. The Czech 
Ministry of Finance publishes its yearly financing strategy, defines maturity, 
fixed and variable rate securities ratio and foreign currency denomination 
benchmarks (in the last years below 15% foreign currency exposure ratio) and 
offers saving bonds available for private persons in its diverse government 
securities portfolio. 
The domestic financing of public debt has a lot of advantages as interest 
income does not leave the country, the surplus liquidity of financial institutions 
can be sterilised without monetary policy interventions and the decreased share of 
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foreign currency and external financing can mitigate the external vulnerability of 
the economy. At the same time domestic financing might lead to inflation and 
enhance the crowding-out effect. Growing government debt often goes together 
with raising interest rates. Broner et al., 2014 warn of the crowding out effect of 
improductive investment (and corrupt spending) leading to increased CDS 
premia, slowing economic performance leading to default on debt if debt is 
dominantly financed from domestic resources. Since 2009 the declining (though 
volatile) interest rates in Europe, however, made it easier for governments of the 
CEECs to fulfil debt service obligations which somewhat contradicts theory. 
 
Figure 6 EU convergence criterion bond yields in the CEECs and the eurozone 
2007Q1:2015 Q1, Source: Eurostat, 2015 (own figure) 
In addition to the international interest rate tendencies, the loose 
monetary policy conducting continuous interest rate cuts, the reduction in 
external vulnerability and positive outlook on the future solvency of the country 
mitigates the risk premia. In the Central European region a stark decrease in the 
risk premia started in mid 2012 which was further fostered by the Council of the 
European Union adopting a regulation on short selling and certain aspects of 
credit default swaps.4 Since mid 2013 the Hungarian CDS premium seceded from 
the Croatian and decreased below the Bulgarian by the end of 2014 and came 
very close to the the Romanian probably due to favourable fiscal data and the 
                                                 
4 According to Horváth et al. (2013) thanks to the regulation Central and Eastern European premia 
shifted 50 basis points lower as compared to their projected path without regulation between October 
and November 2012. The regulation affected CDS transactions concluded before 25th March 2012 
(the entering into effect of the regulation).  
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commitment of the government to reduce external debt. (In the 2012 and 2014 
period the Hungarian debt-to-GDP ratio transcended by 40 the Bulgarian and 5-
10 percentage points the Croatian.) Finally, at the end of 2014 the country risk of 
the emerging countries of the European region went the opposite direction to the 
regional average covered by the CEEMEA5 index. 
 
Figure 7 5-year CDS premia in emerging economies (2012. 01-2015.02.) 
Source: MNB, 2015 
The growing share of the domestic sector in the government securities 
markets, however, implies serious threats for the performance of the private 
economy. However, the negative impact of the stronger and stronger penetration 
of the public sector in the capital market can be verified by the way the increased 
public debt goes together with a declining gross fixed capital formation of the 
economy. The negative correlations have no statistical explanatory power though, 
they can serve as an indication or warning that crowding out is a natural 
consequence of government overspending. 
Table 1  
Correlation between public debt-to-GDP and gross fixed capital formation to 
GDP in the CEECs between 2005 and 2014 
Bulgaria Croatia Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
-0,34 -0,95 -0,93 -0,82 -0,5 -0,6 -0,85 -0,84 
Source: Eurostat, 2015 (own calculation) 
                                                 
5 A Markit iTraxx SovX CEEMEA composite index groups countries in the following categories: 
European Union: Bulgaria, Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, emerging Europe: 
Casahstan, Russia, Turkey, emerging Africa: Abu-Dhabi, South Africa, middle East: Dubai, Israel, 
Qatar. 
PUBLIC FINANCE 832 
 
THE HUNGARIAN SELF-FINANCING PROGRAMME 
The Central Bank of Hungary (MNB) after a series of credit easing 
monetary policy measures launched the so called self-financing programme in 
April 2014 to promote commercial banks’ purchases of government and other 
eligible securities. The aim of the programme is to decrease the external exposure 
of the country both concerning total external debt and public debt. The 
programme rests on realistic footing drawing on the example of neighbouring 
countries and also if we look back to the financing structure of the Hungarian 
public debt from the beginning of the years 2000 when both households and 
actors of the domestic financial sector represented a greater weight among the 
investors of government securities. The self-financing programme could not have 
been realised without the cooperation of the State Debt Management Agency, 
which reduced foreign currency issues to support domestic financing from the 
supply side. 
The MNB aimed at increasing the government securities portfolio of 
banks with government securities and therewith decrease external exposure and 
also the surplus liquidity of banks piled up in central bank sterilisation 
instruments. The Hungarian banking sector is in the middle range among CEECs 
as regards governments securities to balance sheet total of monetary financial 
institutions, with a growing share. 
 
Figure 8 Government bonds to balance sheet total in the CEECs 2011-2014 (own 
figure) Source: ECB, 2015 
The Hungarian self-financing programme included the introduction of 
the IRS tender, which is a variable to fixed conditional interest swap for covering 
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interest risk of credit institutions. Counterparties participating in the tender 
undertake to increase their eligible securities holdings by the amount of the IRS 
transaction. As a great portion of eligible securities selected by the MNB are 
government securities, the IRS tender contributes to the increase in the 
government securities holdings of banks. The success of the self-financing 
programme is – and therewith the positive impact of the IRS facility – can be 
underpinned by the change in the ownership structure in the forint government 
securities (especially bond) market. Between 2012 and 2014 the correlation 
between the time series of the daily forint government bond stock of monetary 
financial institutions and the foreign investors exceeded -0,9, which confirms that 
the banking sector and foreign investors were replacing each other in the 
government securities markets: the growing portfolio of the one was accompanied 
by the declining portfolio of the other. (MNB, 2015) 
 
Figure 9 The ownership structure of Hungarian forint denominated government 
bonds 2012-2014. (percentage of total, own figure) Source: ÁKK, 2015 
 
SUMMARY 
After having pursued different public finance strategies after the system 
change, the CEECs came up against the necessity of applying fiscal stimulus 
during the years of the global financial crisis. The growing budgetary 
expenditures hit those countries especially badly which had accumulated high 
levels of public debt preceding the crisis. The loose fiscal policy measures 
contributed to a fast growing debt-to-GDP ratio in countries with low real GDP 
growth compared to interest rate levels. Despite the continuous policy rate cuts 
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and the ameliorating international environment there are signs of crowding out 
effect as a result of growing debt levels as a result of the anticyclical policies. 
Most of the CEEC countries offer a wide range of government securities which 
helps make debt financing more sustainable together with the fiscal rules required 
by the EU. The dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the Southern countries is 
still alarming, which intimates that the sovereign debt crisis might upsurge in the 
Eatern periphery of Europe again.  
As Hungary could not stimulate the economy with fiscal policy 
measures due to its close to eurozone debt level and the excessive deficit 
procedure, the only way to strengthen economic performance was to deploy 
procyclical fiscal and expansionary monetary policy measures. Monetary policy 
in Hungary is also active in employing measures aimed at alleviating the debt 
burden on the government. As monetary financing is strictly prohibited in the EU, 
the MNB had to use unconventional measures to improve the structure of public 
debt which is the least favourable among the CEEC as regards the share of the 
domestic sector in the government securities market. If public debt financed by 
the domestic sector, however, is absorbed in improductive investment and raises 
risk premia it can lead to crowding out and deteriorating economic performance 
as suggested by public debt theories. 
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